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PETER W. HUBER, GALLIEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN
THE COURTROOM. (Basic Books 1991) [274 pp.] Acknowledgements,
index, notes. CIP: 91-70055; ISBN: 0-465-02623-0. [Cloth $23.00 Harper & Row,
10 E. 53d St., New York, NY 10022.]

GALLIEO'S REVENGE is the latest in a series of Huber's articles and
books critical of the U.S. tort system. 1 In it, his basic criticism is that

the rules of evidence, as applied by technically illiterate judges, permit
the testimony of greedy, dishonest and incompetent expert witnesses to
pull the wool over the eyes of ignorant and gullible citizens who happen
to be chosen for jury duty. For support, he offers up a series of verdicts
that many people have had difficulty accepting and presents evidence on
the other side so as to make those decisions appear to be mindless.
No reasonable person would expect juries always to be "right." As
discussed in an earlier issue of RISK, the jury system is not perfect, but
it is the best we have thus far been able to devise. 2 Even Huber does not
seem to contemplate replacing juries with, e.g., panels of scientists.
Rather, based on his carefully selected and anecdotal evidence, he
proposes reform of rules designed to keep irrelevant, immaterial and
inflammatory evidence away from juries.
Historically, the rule having the most to do with scientific evidence
has been the Frye test. 3 Basically, it excludes expert testimony based
upon a theory or technique, e.g., polygraph evidence, failing to have
"general acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs." 4 There
are many problems with this rule. For example, to what field does
1 See, e.g., Huber, The Bhopalization of U.S. Tort Law, Issues in Science and
Technology, Fall 1985, at 73. For somewhat more veiled criticism, see THE
LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABiiTY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVAION (Huber

and Litan eds. 1991), reviewed in 2 RISK 279 (1991).

2 Bownes, Should Trial by Jury be Eliminated in Complex Caes? 1 RISK 75
(1990). (Judge Bownes was appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals in 1977, after
eighteen years experience as a lawyer and eleven as a trial judge.)
3

From Frye v. U.S., 293 F.2d 1013 (1923).

4 Id., at 1014.
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polygraph analysis or, for that matter, phrenology belong? 5 Thus, in
many jurisdictions the Frye rule has been replaced by other rules
designed to keep pseudoscience from jury consideration.
Huber apparently believes that these rules are inadequate Yet, he
does not advance a specific proposal. Resurrection of the Frye rule,
alone, would not seem to accomplish what he seeks. To recover for a
compensable injury, a plaintiff need only demonstrate that it is more
likely than not that the defendant caused it. This standard of proof is far
lower than the 95% confidence level minimally required for most
"scientific" purposes and accounts for at least some of the verdicts he
criticizes. If such a high standard of proof were adopted, few
defendants would be found liable, and the consequences could be worse
than those Huber reports.
Indeed, something approximating that level of proof (beyond a
reasonable doubt) is required to convict a defendant in a criminal case.
Giving that particular jury some benefit of the doubt, the application of
such a standard may have resulted in acquittals in the recent police
brutality trial in Los Angeles. Fortunately, people rarely react as
violently to decisions with which they disagree as people did there. Yet,
the situation starkly illustrates the consequences of wide-spread lack of
confidence in the legal system.
To avoid a cure potentially worse than the disease, Huber and others
who bewail the impact of pseudoscience on jury verdicts should seek
more effective strategies for demonstrating that such "science" is the
junk they believe it to be. If nothing else, such an approach is far less
patronizing of citizens who respond to calls for jury duty.
Thomas G. Field, Jr.

5 For a recent analysis of Frye and related rules (by a Ph.D. chemist and lawyer),
see Grossman, Science and Scientific Evidence, 32 IDEA 179 (1992).

